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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE MATURE OF T^E CASE 
Appellants, State of Utah and Beverly Larsen, appeal 
fro- an order of the lower court which dismissed a request 
for judgment on an order to show cause that denied appel-
lant, State of Utah, all right to reimbursement for support 
payments* given respondent's children since the entry of a 
$1.00 support order. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court held that the $1.00 per year child 
support order was in fact a valid "order of support1' and 
that the state was not entitled to the Reasonable amount of 
support for money tendered by the state for care of the re-
spondent fs children whether or not the [respondent's 
circumstances had changed, and that that had to be done 
prospectively only. The court gave leave for the state to 
refile the order to show cause to correct flaws which would 
allow a modification for a new support order but outrightly 
dismissed the state's attempt to collect anything since the 
divorce order to that point of time. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
order that a one dollar ($1.00) per year support order is 
an order of support and seek this court to declare the 
same void from its inception. Further, the appellants seek 
this court to direct the lower court to hold a hearing to 
establish what the respondent's liability for support has 
been sirce the entry of the order of $1.00, with directions 
to grant judgment for the amount so declared up to and in-
cluding the $50 per month per child as requested in the 
state's order to show cause. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The co-plaintiff, Beverly Larsen, was awarded a 
decree of divorce from defendant in May of 1967. (R. 24-25) 
Care, custody and control of the parties' three minor child-
ren was awarded to the co-plaintiff, subject to reasonable 
rights of visitation by the defendant. Because of an ill-
ness and physical disability from which defendant then 
suffered, and by reason of emotional problems suffered by 
-2-
the children as a result of defendant's prior conduct, 
the visitation rights of defendant were limited. In addi-
tion, defendant was ordered to pay one dollar ($1.00) 
per year alimony and one dollar ($1.00) per year child sup-
port for the three children. The support orders were, 
however, subject to review and modification by the court, 
as the circumstances of the defendant became such that he 
should be required to pay additional amounts for support. 
Because of defendant's failure to provide support, 
defendant's wife and children were forced to rely upon pub-
lic assistance from April, 1972, througn January, 197 6. 
An a^signrent of collection was execute^ on September 17, 
19~A„ pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9, by which 
plaincir: rights to support for herself and her children 
were subrc-rated to those of the Department of Social Serv-
ices. 
A hearing was held on plaintiffs1 order to show 
cause on April 16, 197 6, ro determine why the child sup-
port provision of the divorce decree should not be modified 
upwards and why a judgment for the reasonable amount of 
support from April, 1972, through February, 1976, based on 
the rate of fifty dollars ($50.00) per Jtionth per child, 
should not be entered against defendant for accrued and 
unpaid child support payments totaling six thousand seven 
hundred and seventeen dollars ($6,717.0Q). 
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The state made an attempt to bring to the court's 
attention the fact of changed circumstances since the entry 
of the order, as well as the contention that the $1.00 order 
is in fact no order of support. The lower court, as per 
Judge Croft, would not allow such evidence in, holding 
that since the order referred to was in fact an order of 
support, the state was not entitled to a retroactive deter-
mination of liability and, therefore, the only matter the 
court could consider was present changed circumstances for 
prospective support only. The court held the order to show 
cause deficient for the prospective hearing but gave leave 
to ccinsel for the state to refile for that matter only. 
Frcn rhis decision, the state appeals, 
POINT I 
THE DIVORCE DECREE SUPPORT ORDER DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER OF SUPPORT AND WAS AN 
A3USE OF THE LOWER COURT'S DISCRETION. 
The sum of one dollar ($1.00) per year for the 
support of three (3) children, which the district court 
ordered in the divorce decree and which the lower court, 
through Judge Bryant H. Croft, affirmed, from which this 
appeal is brought, was void from its inception. A child 
support order requires that an existing need be met. In 
the present case, no need v/as met at the time of the decree 
and no need has been met. In essence, the lower court has 
put its stamp of approval on "non-support" instead of sup-
port. 
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As stated in the early case of Gould v. City of 
Lawrence, 160 Mass. 232, 35 N.E. 462 (1893), "the word 
1
 support1 is often used in our statutes, and in its ordi-
nary signification it includes not merely board, but every-
thing necessary to proper maintenance." And, in Snyder v. 
Lane, 135 W. Va. 887, 65 S,E.2d 483 (1951): "the words 
'maintenance1 and 'support1 are usually synoymous. They 
mean necessaries of life and means of livelihood and include, 
but are not limited to, food, shelter and clothing." Since 
one dollar per year for three children equals but 2.77 cents 
per child per month, this pittance not only fails to pro-
vide for the maintenance of the children, but also renders 
the law farcical and meaningless. 
That the duty to provide support requires a mean-
ingful contribution on the part of an obligor father is 
i 
illustrated by various code provisions J Utah Code Annotated 
78-45-3 (1953) states: "Every man sha4.1 support his wife 
and his child." A "support debt," as defined in Section 
78-45b-2(4), "means the debt created bf nonpayment of child 
support under the laws of this state or the decree of any 
court of appropriate jurisdiction ordering a sum to be 
paid as child support." An indication of what might be re-
quired by way of support is found in Sections 78-45a-l and 
78-45b-2(5). Under Section 78-45a-l, a father is liable 
" . . . for the education, necessary siipport and funeral 
expenses of /his7 child." And, under $ection 78-45b-2(5), 
-5-
11
'Need1 means the necessary costs of food, clothing, shelter 
and medical attendance for the support of any dependent 
child." Obviously, a valid support order must reflect and 
contribute to meeting these needs of the child. 
Not only were the needs of the children in the 
instant case not met, but the court below clearly abused 
its discretion by refusing to follow the guidelines set 
forth in Section 78-45-7: 
"Determination of amount of support.— 
When determining amount due for support the 
court shall consider all relevant factors 
including but not limited to: 
(1) the standard of living and situa-
tion of the parties; 
(2) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(4) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(5) the need of the obligee; 
(6) the age of the parties; 
(7) the responsibility of the obligor 
for the support of others." 
Though the lower court in the divorce decree made mention 
of defendant's illness and physical disability, it clearly 
failed to seriously consider, much less talk about, the other 
relevant factors as contained in 78-45-7, e.g., the standard 
of living and situation of the parties; the relative wealth 
and income of said parties; the needs and ages of the obli-
gee children, etc. Indeed, the ridiculous sum of $1.00 
should prima facie demonstrate that it did not. Years ago, 
this court set forth the basic policy to be followed in the 
Utah courts. This basic policy is found in Rees v. 
Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788 (1957), wherein the 
rule of law decided upon was approved because it gave " . . . 
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primary consideration to the rights and needs of children." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellants are hard put to distinguish which as-
pect of the former order took primary concern for "the 
children." The order, in essence, made the children 
paupers, having to rely on the support of the state through 
public welfare instead of the father who could have paid 
something. The affidavit of the State of Utah for the or-
I - ••• • - . . . . 
der to show cause hearing shows that the defendant didn't 
even pay the "one dollar" per year. 
To disregard the welfare of children as evi-
denced fay -the order is an abuse of discretion of the lower 
coirr-. The state ' s attempt to collect back the reasonable 
amour- of rapport for the several yeari involved goes to 
mitigate this inconsistent position the court originally 
took. Too often, as here, the welfare of the children is 
totally disregarded, as are the statutory duties imposed. 
Equity speaks for varying amounts of support when circum-
stances warrant, but an order of $1.00 a year for three child-
ren is NO ORDER OF SUPPORT, and any jucjge rendering such a 
decision or sanctioning such an agreement has abused the 
discretion granted him to make "equitable" orders. Such an 
order of.2.77 cents per child per month is indeed not equit-
able. This court, in Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 83 Utah 166, 27 P.2d 434, held that a child cannot 
waive support. What right does the coijirt have of taking 
that right away from the child when th^ child cannot even 
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do it himself? Appellants cannot find any reason for such 
logic, 
POINT II 
THE DUTY TO SUPPORT IS CONTINUING AND 
EXISTS REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE OF A 
COURT TO PROVIDE THEREFOR. 
Because of appellant's intense belief that the 
one dollar support order is NO ORDER OF SUPPORT, the ques-
tion then arises as to appellant's right to collect for 
the reasonable support that should have been paid. The 
lower court, as per Judge Croft, denied the appellant's 
right to have that determined or even to have brought to 
the ccurr'c attention the defendant's ability to pay more 
thar: the d*xrreed order fron a change of circumstances, such 
as fceccning employed. 
Therefore, it is appellant's contention, backed 
by the courts of many states, that the duty to support 
exists ana is continuing even when no support order (as in 
this case) is entered. Though this question is one of first 
impression in this state, Justice Ellet in his comments in 
the Whitaker v. l.Tiitaker No. 14329, Filed June 10, 1976, 
emphasized what appellants feel is their position: 
"Of course the defendant, as father of the 
children, would be liable in a civil action 
regardless of the lack of an order in the 
decree of divorce. In fact he might be crimi-
nally liable for failing to provide for his 
minor children if he was willful in that re-
gard.11 (Emphasis added.) 
This sheds some light on the fact that if the one dollar 
order is not considered a "support order" liability still 
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exists to third parties• Simply because a decree uses the 
terms "child support" or "support order" doesn't hide the 
fact that the order isn't what it purports to be. 
This "meaningful contribution" to a child's care 
is a continuing duty through a child*s minority and as 
indicated by Utah Code Annotated 78-4542 and 3, this duty 
continues until age 21, unless a court orders otherwise. 
Utah case lav; reinforces the absolute and continu-
ing nature of this duty. In Jenkins v.[ Jenkins, 107 Utah 
239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944), the court stated that the father 
has a positive duty to support his minor child. And, in 
Rees v. Archibald, supra: 
"This court has invariably emphasized 
the father's obligation to support his child-
ren based upon zhe elementary principle 
that the law imposes upon those who bring 
children into the world the duty to care for 
and support them during their| minority and 
dependency." 
The Colorado court, in Garvin v. Garviri, 108 Colo. 415, 118 
P.2d 768 (1951), declared that the "primary liability of a 
father to support his minor child always exists during 
minority." (Emphasis added*) 
This court has recognized tha|t to take away 
from a defendant the duty and obligations of support cannot 
be done and to do so is void, unless permitted by the law. 
In fact, the court indicated that the duty is so funda-
mental that "there is not vested in any court of this state 
the right to make a final order relieving a father, per-
manently, of his obligation to support 
under the Adoption Statute." Riding v. 
-9-
his child except 
Riding, 8 Utah 2d 
878 (1958). Though it will undoubtedly be argued that the 
order in this case did not go to the extreme as Riding, Id. , 
and that a modification could have been made upon motion 
to the court, the fact that Mrs. Larsen has been on public 
assistance should not allow the respondent to hide be-
hind a purported "order of support" which is void as soon 
as abilities permit contribution of any degree at all. 
That point was at the original hearing date despite of his 
physical disabilities. There is nothing to indicate in the 
findings of fact (R-27) whether the respondent had any other 
income at all. Nonetheless, he has willfully failed to make 
any atter.pt to support his children despite the circumstances 
behind the technicality of the $1.00 support order. 
Because of the continuing nature of this obliga-
tion, the great weight of authority holds the father lia-
ble even where the court has failed to provide for support. 
In Curton v. Gordon, 510 S.W.2d 682 (Texas, 1974), that 
court stated: 
"The natural father has the legal 
duty to support his child, even when not 
ordered by the trial court to make payments." 
And, in Krog v. Krog, 32 C.2d 812, 198 P.2d 510 (1948): 
"The law is established that, despite 
the fact that a final decree of divorce 
contains no provision for support of the 
children of the parties, the court may in 
supplemental proceedings in the divorce ac-
tion order the husband to make payments for 
that purpose. (Citations omitted.) More-
over, a child's rights in this respect can-
not be barred by agreement between the 
parents." 
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Further, in Martinez v. State, 307 S.wJ2d 259 (Texas 
Criminal, 197 5), the court said, in th^ case of criminal 
non-support, that: 
"• .
 # even though the divorce decree 
makes no provision for support and mainte-
nance of the children, the father's duty 
is still primary and continuing*" 
In Rees v. Archibald, supra, the Utah Supreme 
Court succinctly stated the Utah position: " . . • the great 
weight of authority is that a father's 
his minor children is not changed by a 
gives the custody of the children to the wife, but does 
not mention their support," (Emphasis 
Here, of course, support was 
the court really intend 2.77 cents a mdnth to be support? 
If so, the court is placing the stamp of approval on non 
support of anyone who can show he!s not working or has a 
temporary illness. Children must live J too, and it is 
against public policy to encourage fathers this way out. 
obligation to support 
divorce decree which 
added.) 
mentioned, but did 
POINT III 
IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE LOWER COURT 
MAY MAKE AN ORDER OF SUPPORT SUCH AS 
THAT IN THIS CASE ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, 
THE RIGHT TO ENLARGED SUPPORT BEGINS AUTO-
MATICALLY UPON A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
NOTWITHSTANDING A COURT ORDER TO THE CON-
TRARY, 
Though there is support in Utah law that fathers 
may be temporarily relieved of the support obligation "if the 
circumstances warrant," this court should require some legi-
timate reduction of "aid" to the children instead of per-
mitting an over-the-board explusion of p.ny and all obligations, 
-11-
If there is allowed unfettered discretion, every father 
who is out of work, sick, lazy, etc., would have "good 
grounds to have the support reduced as in this case. 
Although it could be argued that the one dollar ($1.00) 
support order was only meant to show that the court below 
was aware of the defendant's support obligation and merely 
intended to demonstrate that said was relieved of his sup-
port duty, this court should restrict the interpretation 
on the language as given by Judge Croft. 
Judge Croft held that even though there might 
have been substantial and material change of circumstances 
sine- the : srler of $1.00 cf support was entered, the father-
def z- iar.i -I no increased dut:y of support until the order 
was 3.;angj ~o a larger arrount. Further, the holding pro-
hibits rhe stare or any other third party furnishing support 
the right tc collect a reasonable compensation for aid ren-
dered even if the defendant-father had the ability to pay. 
A hypothetical at this point would be helpful: 
Mr. X is incapacitated from an acci-
dent and has zero income with no apparent 
ability to work. An order is entered 
totally relieving the defendant from his 
support obligation. One year later, Mr. X 
finds employment and nets $20,000 for the 
year. The ex-wife does not learn of the 
employment until one and one-half years 
later because she has not seen Mr. X. The 
court holds that even though Mr. X has had the 
ability to pay substantial support for one 
and one-half years, he needs not because of 
the prior order. 
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Appellants feel that though 
might exaggerate the situation, they 
tunity to bring to the court's attention 
cumstances and the date such transpired 
reason for the reduction is no longer :j.n existence, the 
•^ he above hypothetical 
should have the oppor-
any change of cir-
, because if the 
order of the court is based on a non-existent situation* 
support 
ppealed 
therefor 
Therefore, the lower court should be r 
situation to see if the ability to 
ence some time before the hearing a 
nonetheless maintain that a one dollar 
porr is no support order and are, 
have the lower court review the entire 
judgment for the reasonable amount ovezf 
Factors that would and should 
as follows: change in ability to earn 
investments, re-marriage, pensions, 
social security, etc. Each of these fc| 
what ability the father of children ha 
that once a $1.00 order is entered thai 
behind that "cloak" without divulging 
court is to judicially disgrace the 
the moral duty parents should have for 
While this court has held, iij 
that no court of the state can make a 
ing the father of his obligations to su[ 
the adoption statute, Rockwood v. 
laws 
^quired to review the 
came into exist-
from. Appellants 
($1.00) order of sup-
e, entitled to 
period and enter a 
that period of time, 
be evaulated are 
income, new jobs, 
fs compensation, 
ctors tend to show 
to support. To say 
a father can hide 
changes to the 
of this state and 
their children. 
Riding, supra, 
workmen} 
any 
fjinal order reliev-
pport except under 
Rock^ood, 65 Utah 2 61, 
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236 P. 457 (1957) , has given indication that this could 
temporarily do away with the obligation. This court said: 
"The duty of the father to support 
his children, if he is able to do so, is 
imposed in this state by positive statute." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Further, in Hulse v. Hulse, 111 Utah 193, 176 P.2d 875 (1947), 
the court reiterated: " . . . the father has the legal duty 
to support his minor child if he is able to do so." Equity 
calls for a review of circumstances, but appellants point 
out that there is a wide gulf between "support" and "contri-
bution* " Though a legitimate support order might be $100-150 
per month, courts should not totally do away with the 
support: obligation, as in this case, unless the facts are 
so extreme as to warrant that action as the only alternative. 
Appellants don?t read the above cases to say that the obliga-
tion can be done away. These cases in equity show that if a 
father cannot "support" a child or children, that if he can 
contribute something towards their support, then he should. 
For example, one might be able to contribute $2 0 per 
month—which cannot literally be considered "support"— 
but cannot pay $10 0 per month, which is a support order. 
Does that mean that if one cannot pay $100 or over $50 
that he should pay nothing? NO I IF THE FATHER CAN CON-
TRIBUTE ANYTHING, HE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO DO SO. The $1.00 
order, however, is an abuse of this equitable principle. 
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The reason is that equity goes both waVs. Though it 
might be equitable to relieve the father of the full sup-
port obligation, the court must look at the welfare of the 
children and allow equity to look aftey their interests as 
well. 
The exceptions to the genera 
are summarized in 69 ALR2d, Section 2, 
duty of support 
as follows: 
"An exception to the general rule 
that a father is liable for the support 
of a child after a divorce exists in some 
states in cases where the father was unable 
to pay for the support of his child at the 
time it was furnished, or the circumstances 
were such that if the mother had applied in 
advance for a support order the court would 
not have required the father to support his 
child* This exception is usually recognized 
in true hardship cases, where) the father has 
r^en physically unable to worlk. for a long period 
:J time and has little or no [property. " (Empha-
es change from this 
basis for the order 
s is added.) 
Once again
 f however, if the circumstancje 
"physical inability to work," the whole 
of reduction ceases and the duty of support is automatically 
reinstated. The lower court should then make a determination 
from that point of time onward as to wh^t the liability will 
be. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Haugen v. Swanson, 
222 Minn., 23 N.W.2d 535 (1946), entertained this same ques-
tion and said: 
"The father of a child will not be relieved 
of liability to support it except where his 
inability to do so clearly appears." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Once again, the equitable principle is clear that 
if there is a time the circumstances for reduction have 
changed so that it is not "clear" that the reduction should 
continue, the "duty" once again arises and a court is given 
authority to retroactively review the situation from that 
point onward. 
There are many times in divorces where personal 
jurisdiction over the father is not possible* The court 
must then make an order something to the effect that the 
marter of child support will be held in abeyance pending 
jurisdicrior. over the father. To take the logic of Judge 
Cref-'s zrl„z further is to say that because there was no 
jur^ciicri n over the absent father, no legal or moral duty 
exirt: u^i.l the decree Lz modified. This is a totally 
naive position to take. If a court gets jurisdiction over 
the abser.z father at some later date—which could be months 
or years—that court has the right to make the determination 
as to the father's liability while absent. This is clear 
even though a divorce decree might be silent on the matter 
of support entirely. 
While it is generally held that modified orders 
are not given retroactive effect, equity, the welfare of 
children, reimbursement to the state and other reasons all 
give support to the basic view that IF A FATHER CAM SUPPORT 
OR CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUPPORT OF HIS CHILDREN, HE SHOULD BE 
LIABLE THEREFOR. 
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of his duty of 
so knows that relief 
as he remains ill 
of his own personal 
in circumstance 
That an obligor father knows 
support is clear; the obligor father al\t 
therefrom can be effective only so long[ 
or disabled. The father is well aware 
condition and of any subsequent change 
which would reinstate his continuing diity. To relieve the 
father of all liability after he has recovered because of 
his willful failure to report his improved condition to 
the court or because of lack of diligence on the part of 
other parties involved would open the door to abuse and en-
courage fraud and irresponsibility. A 
example, be disabled for a short time, 
earn a substantial salary and yet owe nothing merely be-
u i 
father could, for 
bo back to work, 
discovered or acted .s changed circumstance was not 
upon. Public policy should require that the circumstances 
be considered. 
A primary reason for not allowing retroactive 
application of a revised court order is 
the father being ordered to pay sums wh 
to him. Such a situation, however, is 
court has the competence to know the "n 
"needs" of the father, and has the ability to establish 
liability based on principles of fairness and justice. 
Thus, given the continuing absolute nature of a 
fatherfs support duty, the strong possibility of fraud and 
abuse, and the fact that the state has Xittle choice but 
the possibility of 
ich would be unfair 
before the court. The 
beds" of children, the 
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to provide assistance and is frequently not in a position 
to protect itself from acts of irresponsible individuals, 
the lower court erred by not allowing the state to collect 
reimbursement for sums expended in behalf of defendant's 
children at least from the time of changed circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
No court of this state should have the right to 
reduce the support obligation to 2.7 cents per child per 
month. To do so mocks the very principles upon which our 
society is based—responsibility. 
This court should hold void the $1.00 support 
order as being no order at all and remand the case to the 
lower court for a determination of what liability the de-
fendant-respondent has since the entry of the order. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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